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Election observation mission to El Salvador 2009.Municipal, legislative and presidential Elections


About El Salvador

History of El Salvador


 

The territory of El Salvador, located within the Central American cultural area, was inhabited by various indigenous peoples among which we can highlight the Pipil, Lenca, and to a lesser extent, various Mayan groups. After the Spanish conquest, the country (together with the other countries that are now located in the Central American region) became a part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, until the independence of a federal Central America from Spain in 1821. The internal rivalries that arose throughout this period between "imperialists" and "republicans" escalated into civil war in 1827.

 

The President of the Central American Republic, General Francisco Morazán, tried to avoid the demise of the federal pact that had come into effect in 1839. From El Salvador, Morazán undertook to maintain the union; however, his integrationist struggle was defeated in 1840, leading to the division of the Central American region.

 

During the colonial era, the economy of El Salvador was based on the production of indigo; moreover, the invention of synthetic dyes in the 19th Century significantly reduced the price of this commodity forcing the nation to transform its national production base. The decision to adopt coffee as its main produce, which soon became one of the main pillars of its economy, heralds the beginning of its modern history. In fact, coffee production restructured the country's economic system as well as its political system. Furthermore, the need to obtain lands for coffee plantations as required by this economic model heightened a pre-existing trend towards the excessive concentration of land-ownership. 

 

The coffee oligarchy consolidated itself as the country's dominant economic sector. The dramatic repercussions and destabilisation El Salvador suffered due to the financial crisis in the United States in 1929, combined with the slump in international coffee prices, generated enormous economic costs, but the social costs were even greater. 

 

Politically, in the 1920s a failed attempt was made to introduce democracy in the country through a series of reforms promoted by Pío Romero Bosque, which reached their peak in President Araujo's nine-month government in 1931. This short-lived period of democratisation came to an abrupt end with General Hernández Martínez's coup towards the end of 1931. This event marks the beginning of a new era in El Salvador's socio-political history, a period marked by a series of military governments that ruled the country for nearly half a century. Indeed, during this period an attempt was made to maintain the foundations of the agro-exporting economic model sustained by continuous repression and violence. 

 

It is worth highlighting that in January 1932 a historic peasant-indigenous uprising took place in various coffee-growing villages, which was joined by the Salvadoran Communist Party headed by Farabundo Martí. This revolt was followed by one of the bloodiest repressions in Latin America history, when General Hernández Martínez ordered repressive measures that led to the death of between 10,000 and 30,000 indigenous peasants (including men, women and children) throughout the country. This tragic episode commonly referred to as "The Massacre" ("La Matanza"), left the country's indigenous culture practically on the verge of extinction.   

 

A process of industrialisation was undertaken during the 1960s, within the framework of the Central American Common Market and with the support of the "Alliance for Progress" initiative. Although very high rates of growth were accomplished, these were not sufficient to reduce unemployment, which in previous decades had forced 300,000 landless peasants to emigrate towards Honduras. 

 

This demographic pressure, together with the rivalries between the respective national industrial elites pushed El Salvador and Honduras towards armed conflict in June 1969. This violent conflict, which lasted one-hundred hours, is better known as the "Football War," and caused hundreds of casualties. This war also destabilised the regional Common Market and dragged Salvadoran industry into crisis. After many decades of military rule, various popular initiatives emerged against the ruling political and economic regime.

 

Therefore, by the beginning of the 1970s, several political and social actors, opposed to military rule and the agro-exporting model, started to mobilise themselves. In the early 1970s, the opposition struggle from popular and workers' movements took on a fresh momentum. This period saw the birth of legal opposition groups, such as PDC, UDN and MNR (of a Christian Democrat, Communist and Social Democrat stance, respectively) as well as guerrilla movements. By 1972, the legal opposition united under the banner of the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) and proposed José Napoleón Duarte as a -civilian- candidate to the Presidency, running against Colonel Arturo Molina. 

 

The elections held in 1972 and 1977 were marked by electoral fraud, intended to maintain power in the hands of the military, and hereby opening the way to constant political crises during the 1970s. Faced with rising social conflict and in an effort to contain the crisis, a coup took place in 1979 with the aim of easing the transition towards civilian government through the interim of a junta that was both military and civilian (including members of the Social Democrat and Christian Democrat movements). Nevertheless, this attempt failed, and repression continued unabated. As an example, on 24th March 1980, the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero was murdered by Right-wing extremists while he celebrated a mass. This murder was a nail on the coffin for a potentially peaceful solution to the conflict that was starting to take shape. In this manner, despite the efforts made by the civilian-military junta to contain the imminent armed conflict, civil war broke out in the early 1980s.

 

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) was formed in October 1980, to coordinate the work of five political-military insurgent organisations. On the following year, these organisations launched their "final offensive," officially triggering the outbreak of civil war. This war lasted throughout the 1980s, within an international political context that was polarised along the lines of the Cold War, and where the influence of the neighbouring Sandinista Revolution, together with the Cuban Revolution and, on the other hand, the role played by the United States, under President Ronald Reagan, in support of the counter-insurgents, cannot be neglected. This period was marked by numerous human rights violations in El Salvador. According to reports of the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, the segments of the population most affected by repression were women, students and trade-union activists. Although the most important civilian massacres (El Mozote with nearly 1,000 deaths and Río Sumpul with 600 victims) had been committed by the army in the early 1980s, even as late as 1989 six Jesuits and two female employees who worked at the Central American University (UCA) in the capital were murdered. 

 

Within this context, characterised by the outbreak of civil war and by the rise to power of Christian Democrats together with their reformist policies, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) political party consolidated itself around 1986, unifying the traditional holders of economic power with other ultra-conservative sectors of Salvadoran society. This political project launched a political and ideological counter-offensive and defeated any remaining reformist programmes as well as the Christian Democrats by coming to power in the 1989 elections. Moreover, it altered the country's economic structure by developing a series of political measures aimed at generating greater economic liberalisation, in accordance with the indications of the Washington Consensus, and very much in-line with the changes in global political economy that were taking place, at that time, around the world.

 

After, a long process of negotiations, the Peace Agreements, better known as the "Chapultepec Agreements," between the Salvadoran State and the guerrilla were signed in Mexico City on 16th January 1992. These agreements represent the first real attempt to establish dialog and a social pact in the nation's history. Not only did they put an end to a long civil war, these agreements intended to establish the basis for the democratisation of the Salvadoran political system. 

 

This brought about an unparalleled process in Salvadoran history, as spaces for negotiation and legal participation opened up for political actors, such as the FMLN, that were until then excluded. The Agreements, which were the product of a series of negotiations in which the mediation role of the United Nations proved to be critical, are essentially, a series of concessions made by both parts to the conflict to be implemented in the years following the signing of the legal agreement. Among the stipulations of the Peace Agreements, it is worth highlighting the government's obligation to reduce its armed forces by half, totalling 30,000 troops by 1994 as well as dissolving the state intelligence service. From 3rd March, a new civilian police was to be created incorporating members of the FMLN. In January 1992, the National Reconciliation Law extended an amnesty to all political prisoners. Furthermore, the government committed itself to offer land to all combatants and assistance to peasant-farmers from both sectors. 

 

On 15th February 1993, the last 1,700-armed rebels handed over their weapons in a ceremony that was witnessed by various Heads of State of Central American states as well as by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Ghali. The National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil) was established, as well as the Human Rights Office (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos) and the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Supremo Electoral). While the Agreements served as a basis to redefine the country's social and political relations, the implementation of the specific commitments experienced considerable difficulties, delays and resistances. This was patent in the need to renegotiate and reschedule some of the concrete agreements in the months that followed the signing of the Agreements.

 

The results of the investigation on human rights violations carried out by the Truth Commission (Comisión Verdad), created by the United Nations, led to the resignation of the Minister of Defence, General René Emilio Ponce. Ponce was mentioned in the aforementioned investigation as being one of the instigators behind the murder of the six Jesuits of the Central American University in San Salvador in 1989. According to the Commission's final report, the military, the death squads linked to them and the State were responsible for 85% of the human rights violations that took place during the war. It also recommended the dismissal of 102 high-ranking officers and the deprivation of political rights for some former guerrilla leaders.

 

President Cristiani (ARENA) suggested a general amnesty for cases of violent abuses that was approved only five days after the Truth Commission report was divulged, on 20th March 1993. This decision implied that the most serious crimes committed during the war went unpunished. On the other hand, according to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the violence did not end with the peace agreements. Beyond the existence of intelligence activities within the Armed Forces, the links between the military and organised crime, together with the lack of effective measures to integrate demobilised members from both factions led to a rise in criminality.

 

One year later, on 20th March 1994, the first elections after the signing of the Peace Agreements were held. The candidate of the Left-wing coalition comprising the FMLN and other groups obtained 25.5% of the ballots in the first round, against 49.2% for ARENA's Armando Calderón Sol. Although the Left complained about the existence of fraud, the UN observers in the country (ONUSAL) stated that there had been no fraud in the polls.

 

After the elections, the FMLN faced an internal crisis that led to a cleavage within the party after the withdrawal of the ERP and RN, two of the five organisations that were part of the FMLN. The new government managed to increase economic growth to 5% per annum, as well as controlling inflation, which in the first months of 1994 reached 5%. Nonetheless, poverty did not decrease. According to official statistics, 29% of Salvadorans live beneath the poverty line, and 22% in extreme poverty. Over 400,000 children under the age of six suffer from chronic malnutrition and 15% of children under the age of five are in a situation of moderate to serious malnutrition.

 

Recent Political History of the Two Main Salvadoran Political Parties and Current Electoral Context 

 

Since the signing of the peace agreements, the structure of Salvadoran political power has evolved practically within a bi-partisan system between ARENA and the FMLN, the two political forces that are currently competing for the presidency in the 2009 elections. The remaining political parties share a quota of between 20% and 25% of the legislative power and of the municipal governments, the rest of which is in the hands of the two main aforementioned parties. The rivalry between both main parties is still based on solid foundations, given that they were both the main actors of the war and of the subsequent peace agreements negotiations. 

 

Four parties are competing in the March 2009 polls to elect the President of the Republic (ARENA, FMLN, PCN and PDC) whereas six are vying for legislative and municipal power (the four previous parties plus the FDR and the CD). ARENA has maintained control over the executive branch for four consecutive terms since 1989. The same party has also managed to keep a relative control over the legislative with a simple majority, thanks to its traditional alliance with other Right-wing parties (PCN) and Centre-Right parties (PDC). As of 1994, all legislative decisions requiring a qualified majority have had to be approved with votes in favour from the FMLN. In this manner, the latter party has obtained a power of veto on especially significant legislative matters that require such qualified majorities (international loans, the appointment of indirectly selected civil servants such as magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, the approval of international public debt, etc.) In the legislative and municipal elections held in 1997, ARENA lost control over a large proportion of local governments; among them, the nation's most important one, San Salvador, which voted in favour of the FMLN. 

 

Since then, the FMLN has maintained control over this municipality. Although ARENA controls a larger number of municipal governments, at the local level the FMLN governs over a larger number of inhabitants than those who reside in municipalities governed by ARENA. After nearly twenty years wielding executive power, ARENA is suffering from the effects of such a long-drawn incumbency. This weariness is exacerbated by the consistently precarious economic situation in which the majority of the population has lived throughout its various mandates, added to the serious economic crisis that is sweeping through the United States, which has had severe and immediate repercussions on El Salvador. The FMLN has been ahead of ARENA in all of the public opinion polls published since September 2007, month in which Mauricio Funes was proclaimed as the FMLN's candidate to the presidency.

 

In the public opinion polls published over the last three months by universities and independent companies, Funes' advantage over Ávila was of 15% on average. During this same period, the polls commissioned by the media (La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy), reflect a significantly diluted advantage within a bracket of 2% to 6%. If the latter polls were to prove to be more precise, the potential for a second round is practically a given. Otherwise, the FMLN could still hope for victory in the first round. The spectre of a possible victory of the Left in the 2009 presidential elections prompted the President of the Republic to embark on a premature electoral campaign (beyond the legal limits) in favour of his party as of mid-2007. 

 

In a speech given to the Armed Forces, on the occasion of the "Day of the Soldier" the President reflected upon the role of this body in the fight against communism and explicitly called upon them to remain vigilant against this same menace that, according to him, was once again threatening the nation. President Saca continued with his proselytising activities visiting different municipalities in the country in his capacity as president of his political party, even when this implied a certain conflict given his mandate as President of the Republic. Facing criticism from sectors closely linked to his party, Saca decided to put an end to this initiative. Nevertheless, he invited other Right-wing parties (PCN and PDC) to present a single presidential ticket, with the aim of successfully challenging the Left, in an attempt to avoid repeating recent Nicaraguan electoral history, in which Daniel Ortega's victory was interpreted as being partly due to divisions between Right-wing parties in that country in the run-up to the elections. 

 

Although there were reports of some meetings between ARENA and the PCN, these negotiations did not prosper. Minor tensions were unleashed within the PCN and the PDC, given that the latter is hoping to become the country's third political force, instead of the PCN, as well as trying to transform itself into ARENA's most important ally in the Legislative Assembly. The Left's electoral chances were already seen as positive among self-proclaimed independent sectors, as well as among smaller Left-wing parties. Arturo Zablah, currently ARENA's candidate to the Vice-Presidency, launched an initiative in mid-2007 aiming to establish a broad alliance among opposition parties to "remove ARENA from the executive." Zablah drafted a proposal that he presented "before civil society," in which he presented himself as a presidential candidate for such a potential alliance, on the precondition of ensuring the support of all Left-wing parties. This proposal did not come to fruition given that the FMLN ignored it, perceiving itself to be sufficiently strong to face the electoral contest without having to reach compromises with other parties. The resilience of the FMLN's current electoral ambitions can be assessed by comparing the current electoral process with previous presidential polls, where by the month of September of the year prior to the elections, ARENA was already firmly positioned at the head of all opinion polls and firmly in front of the FMLN. This is something, which even by the month of December, prior to the 2009 presidential elections, ARENA has yet to manage. 

 

Experience and evolution of the political parties present in the 2009 electoral contest

The six registered parties have undergone numerous transformations as well as internal infighting over the last decade, with the exception of the recently created FDR. Moreover, only the ARENA party is facing these elections still under the effects of its most recent conflict, unleashed around the nomination of its presidential candidate, after controversial primary elections. 

 

ARENA's experience from 1997 to the present day

The two main political parties have faced internal crises for various reasons, which in some cases have even led to splintering, especially after biting electoral defeats. In 1996 the movement known as the "maneques," that is, close friends of ARENA's founder Roberto D'Aubuisson, demanded a greater share of power within the party. Some members of this movement defected in 1997 into the ranks of the PCN and later founded the PAN (for the 2000 elections), under the leadership of Horacio Ríos. This party disappeared after the 2003 elections as it failed to obtain the legally required minimum number of votes. After the 1997 elections there was rising criticism within ARENA claiming that the party was being dominated by big capital, two of the previously elected presidents were related to this structure or had family ties with it. From that point onwards, professional politicians started to acquire greater relevance in party decisions. Thus, Francisco Flores who presented himself as an average citizen, close to the people, was nominated and won the presidential elections. 

 

The current President of the Republic, Tony Saca, presented his candidature and eventually won the presidency, following a similar strategy. These changes in candidate profiles were very beneficial for ARENA, who dispelled the commonly held perception that it was an "elitist" party linked to big capital. Despite these facelifts, ARENA's policies have not experienced a similar transformation in the last twenty years, a situation that is reflected in the persistently precarious economic and social situation in which the majority of the population has lived in for the last two decades. This context represents an important factor that is playing against the efficiency and credibility of the electoral messages and proselytising strategies that the party has developed to date. A fact that is clearly echoed in the public opinion polls published in the last three months by IUDOP, UTEC and CID-Gallup, all of which are renowned for the quality of their opinion polls. 

 

Another element that is playing against ARENA's interests in the current electoral context appeared in the first internal debates regarding the nomination of the future presidential candidate. According to reports published in El Faro and other sources, President Saca originally selected his Minister for Public Security and Justice, René Figueroa, as his presidential candidate. This choice was openly criticised by various sectors of the Right. After Figueroa expressed his intentions regarding the presidency, Saca finally promoted the candidature of another of his closest collaborators, Rodrigo Ávila. The primaries, which were criticised for numerous reasons, left behind a trail of resentment and deep scars between the factions that sympathised with one or the other of the candidates, who complained about irregularities. Moreover, the campaign is still far from over and much can still change. One must not underestimate the powerful propaganda machinery that is in ARENA's hands nor the media resources at its disposal, which may serve to influence and alter public opinion. Some news items that have been recently over-exaggerated by local Right-wing media outlets seem to be following this reasoning. 

 

For example, the case of the accusations levied against the FMLN in October 2008 regarding its alleged participation in the kidnapping of a businessman in Panama that same year, based on a vague email dated from 2002, and supposedly found in former commander of the Colombian FARC, Raúl Reyes' laptop computer. This story was originally leaked to the press by the State Intelligence Agency (Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado). The extraordinary coverage given to the alleged existence of armed groups linked to the FMLN seems to be following the same tortuous path, based, as it is based on photographs of public commemorative events held by the Left in which replicas of firearms were used. In any case, such commemorative events are potentially controversial given that they are reminiscent of war-like actions.

 

The FMLN's experience from 1997 to the present day

The FMLN, as a legally established political party, has a long history of internal wrangling. Its first split occurred on its very first participation in an electoral campaign, in the 1994 general elections. 

 

Soon after the new Legislative Assembly that had been constituted after these elections started to operate, the faction headed by Joaquín Villalobos split from the FMLN and established itself as a nascent independent party. This movement did not survive its first foray as an independent party in the 1997 elections. In the following legislative mandates (1997, 2000 and 2003), the FMLN's legislative faction suffered the desertion of one or two of its deputies. According to some analysts, these deputies were tempted away by ARENA's economic might, who needed these additional votes for the approval of whatever legislation it was passing that required a qualified majority (two-thirds of the 84 members of the Assembly). These desertions pushed the party to impose greater internal controls in the selection of its candidates, privileging loyalty towards party principles. 

 

This process was soon interpreted and popularised through the media, justly or unjustly, under the title of the "orthodox imposition" allegedly by the party's communist faction, which led to the growing marginalisation of dissidents. Despite these radical outbursts, the FMLN regularly appointed persons that were not party militants to important positions. In 1994 its candidates for President and Vice-President (Rubén Zamora and Francisco Lima, respectively) were not from its traditional rank and file. In 1997, 2000 and 2003 its winning candidates to the Mayor's Office in San Salvador (Héctor Silva in the first two elections, and Carlos Rivas in the 2003 polls), did not come out of its militant base. Having said this both concluded their municipal mandates distancing themselves from the party; furthermore, Carlos Rivas Zamora is currently running as the PDC's presidential candidate. 

 

After the 1999 presidential elections, the FMLN's losing presidential candidate, Facundo Guardado, clashed with the rest of the party's leadership and left the party creating a new political movement, which was similarly unable to survive its first electoral test, in 2003. A new split took place within the FMLN's parliamentary block, at the end of the 2003 to 2006 legislative period, eventually giving rise to the FDR party headed by Julio Hernández, former FMLN appointed magistrate to the Supreme Electoral Court between 1999 and 2004. The FDR party will now be testing its chances in the upcoming Legislative and Municipal elections. Despite all of these cleavages, the FMLN's electoral power base does not seem to have been significantly eroded, partly due to the reigning bi-partisan nature of Salvadoran politics and the climate of political polarisation that is promoted in one way or another by both main political parties. 

 

In proposing its current presidential and vice-presidential ticket, the FMLN exhibited great audacity and intelligence by selecting Mauricio Funes as its presidential candidate. Funes has extensive experience in journalism and is a well-known presenter of interview programmes on television. For nearly twenty years, Funes has accumulated significant credibility and sympathy as a sharp and independent critic. The candidate's resilience has been put to the test by the varied and intense smear campaigns launched by ARENA, albeit according to opinion polls, they have not excessively damaged his image. In fact, even the party as such, seems to be profiting from its candidate's powerful image, given that, according to the same opinion polls, its popularity has risen above that of ARENA. According to several highly considered newspaper columnists such as, Roberto Rubio and Joaquín Samayoa, who are in no manner suspect of being FMLN sympathisers, up to now, the FMLN seems to be managing its electoral strategy in a more effective manner.

 

Basic Bibliography of Salvadoran Literature: Roque Dalton "Historias prohibidas del Pulgarcito"; José Ignacio López Vigil "Las mil y una historias de la Radio Venceremos";  Ignacio Ellacuría "Veinte años de historia de El Salvador (1969-1989)"; Claribel Alegría "Cenizas de Izalco"; María López Vigil "Piezas para un retrato".

 


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